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SBA Votes To Fund 
ThreeStudent Groups 
Three student groups seeking 
re-funding for the current academic 
year were voted a budget of 
approximately $1500 each at the 
November 8 meeting of the SBA. 
Roughly half of ' the budgets will 
go to projects and representation 
at conventions, the other half to 
be consummed by operating expenses. 
After voting itself a budget of 
$12,000, half of which will go to 
the Speakers Program and $4000 of 
which is earmarked for rental of 
the various basement offices, the 
SBA allocated $1,535 to the Black 
American Law Students Association. 
The greup's Law Day receives a 
$75 grant, and a yet-unnamed 
student project will take $250. 
The National Lawyers Guild's $1515 
budget shows two project allocations. 
One, at $350, will fund a handbook, 
currently being prepared, which will 
outline for the layperson the state 
law on divorce and voluntary 
dissolution of marriage, with the 
hope of enabling people to avoid 
burdensome attorney's fees. The 
Guild is working in conjunction 
with Cleveland Women's Counseling, 
and with adjunct faculty member 
Susan Stauffer, who is director 
of the Cleveland Legal Aid's domestic 
relations division. (See page 9) 
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Library Ranks Low 
In State, National Studies 
By Mike "Evans 
Last issue the consequences of the 
$78,000 cut in the requested budget 
for Cleveland-Marshall's library were 
presented. A more detailed and 
revised list of what the library has 
already lost is now available: 120 out 
of the library's 170 serials have been 
cancelled, consisting mostly of loose-
leaf services and monographs; 20 state 
codes have been cancelled; duplicate 
copies of 50 law reviews have been 
cancelled; all encyclopedias, ALR 
systems and Federal statutes have 
been cut from two to one copies; the 
Na tional Reporter system has been cut 
from t hree to two copies; and the 
library is open 13 fewer hours this 
year than last. These losses just 
add insult to injury in the case of 
Clevelsnd-Marshall, whose largest 
detriment is the inadequacy of its 
library. 
Where Cleveland-Marshall stands 
nationally is best illustrated by 
the comparative library statistics as 
of July 1, 1974, compiled by the 
Association of American Law Schools 
for its 126 member schools. Cleveland-
Marshall ranked 20 of 126 in student 
body size but 122 of 126 in total 
volumes per student. It ranked 47 
of 126 in faculty size but 123 of 
126 in total volumes per faculty 
member. It ranked 101 of 126 in 
total volumes and 100 of 125 in 
students per library staff. 
A look at the results of a table 
published in the ABA publication Law 
and Learning and recently reprinted in 
the Student Lawyer gives another view 
of where Cleveland-Marshall stands 
in the law school rankings. The table 
was compiled from data published in 
the 1974-75 "ABA Review of Legal 
Education." Six categories were 
assigned a point value from one to 
eight from which a total score was 
determined. The lower the score, 
the better the school's resources. 
The categories considered were the 
number of students (C-M scored in 
group 1), student/volume ratio 
(C-M, 8) student/faculty ratio 
(c-M, 7) number of faculty (C-M, 2), 
faculty , rolume ratio (C-M, 8), and 
volumes in library (C-M, 3). 
Cleveland-Marshall's total score was 
29. The highest score was 14 and 
the lowest 41. 
Out of t h e 130 schools included in 
t he survey , Cleveland-Marshall 
ranked below 74 schools, in the same 
group as 15, and received a better 
score than 41. However, compared 
t o the o t her law schools in Ohio, 
Cleveland- Ma rshall came out only 
above Capital, which scored a 31. 
C- M v. Other Ohio Law Schools 
The results of the study depended 
greatly on the size of a law school's 
library which in turn, depends on 
the amount of money it has to spend. 
(See page 8) 
Ramsey Clark To Speak On Law And Social Change 
Former U.S. Attorney General 
Ramsey Clark, who's resume reads 
like a history of the civil rights 
movement, will speak here this 
Tuesday, November 25, at noon in the 
student lounge. 
His subject will be "The Law: An 
Effective Instrument for Social 
Change." The lecture is free and 
open to the public. 
Clark servetl in the Justice Depart-
ment under the Kennedy and early 
Johnson administrations, and was 
the Attorney General from 1967-69. 
Issues upon which he has focused 
his efforts, and concerning which he 
has consistently taken reformist 
positions, have included: desegregation 
and housing discrimination litigation, 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968, prosecution 
of police in killing and brutality 
cases, wiretapping restraint and 
disclosure, antitrust suits for anti-
competitive practices and mergers, 
and federal gun control. 
Since returning to private practice, 
his clients have included Philip 
Berrigan in the Harrisburg trial, 
Ruchell Magee in the Marin County 
Courthouse murder-kidnapping indict-
ment, and Charles Pernasalice in the 
Attica prison prosecutions. Clark 
also travelled to North Vietnam, 
where he examined the results of 
American bombing and visited U.S. 
P.O.W. 's. 
The lecture is part of the SBA 
Speakers Program. 
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Sunshine 1n 0 hio 
Perhaps the most encompassing 
Sunshine Law in the country takes 
legal effect in Ohio this Friday. 
The Act, which by its terms 
requires a liberal construction of 
its provisions, is a long step on 
the way to bringing the operations 
of state decision-making bodies out 
into the open. It affirms the 
principle that the people do not, 
simply by electing government 
representatives, abdicate their 
right to personally witness or be 
informed about the deliberations 
of state legislatures, commissions, 
agencies or institutions. 
Not the least of such "institutions" 
is this law school. Just as the 
university's board of trustees -has 
already opened its meetings to the 
public in response to the new Act, 
this faculty, the "decision-making 
body" of this school, will assumedly 
open its meetings to the public 
gaze. Recent debate among them 
indicates they expect to abide 
by the new law. 
The next meeting of the faculty 
is December 12 at 3:00 p.m.,in 
room 2062. We will be there. We 
suggest you exercise your new 
right, and join us. 
To the Editor: 
Being a past editor of The Gavel, 
I try to read each issue of the news-
paper. In the November 6, 1975 issue 
I read a news story (page 3) and an 
editorial (page 2) which dealt with 
the request made by students to 
convene a faculty-student committee 
to investigate Professor Sonenfield's 
competence to teach. 
Any CSU law student who proposes 
that Professor Sonenfield is 
incompetent to teach in law school 
belongs to a protected class of 
individuals defined in the Depart-
ment of Labor's Regulations issued 
under Section 503 of Public Law 
93-112, viz., mentally handicapped 
persons. 
If you really want to know the 
truth, that phony student request 
would depress the hell out of 
Holden Caulfield. I swear, it really 
would. 
Lila Daum Anderson '73 
Editor-in-Chief of The Gavel 
1972-1973 
To the Editor: 
It is time to bring the 
"Sonenfield Affair" to an end! At 
this time, the administration is 
awaiting an opinion from the 
University Attorney with respect to 
the jurisdiction of the Dean's 
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Famous In The Neighborhood 
Famous in the neighborhood stripped 
Among children and dogs By its competition from the Pentagon 
And al I I iving things hidden Pollution is reaching eel ipse proportion 
I walk about talking nonsense We are left muttering to ourselves 
lnhal ing through the ears energy Traditional graffiti 
Puttin g humor on the mouth showing teeth And pity poor protest 
In the street I run amuck Bound. Gagged. Held in contempt 
Having learned in my quest Mediocrity sits in the judgment seat 
For ma x imum security The mad bombers are on the way 
A flair for fair play ... yet, the rain falls, the grass is wet 
Eve rything, truly, amazes me The robin eats the worm 
How people get up, go to work The voices of children are heard from 
How they get through the day the turtle 
Without breaking down In the sandbox in the park 
How at night they sleep so sound As the sun, sti I I famous in my neighbor-
Ah, citizens, shopkeepers, servants of hood 
the law Shines its shoes and walks through the 
This is, indeed, an age of obscenities sky 
The four-letter word has long been out- -Daniel Thompson 
Letters to the Editor 
Faculty Advisory Council to hold 
a hearing on the matter. We feel 
a presentation of the facts and 
circumstances leading up to the 
present situation is in order. 
First, the facts have been 
distorted beyond belief by the 
emotionally charged and erroneous 
reporting of the original memo and 
the subsequent events. Prof. 
Sonenfield's memo to Dean Messerman 
requested that she: 
" .•. use her efforts to 
reduce to the extent 
possible the assignment of 
students in the LCOP program 
to the two sections of 
Property" (which he currently 
teaches. 
He gave the following reason for the 
request: 
"The academic results of most 
of those whom I have taught 
in the past have been 
satisfactory neither for them 
nor for me. I desire to avoid, 
to the extent that I can 
possibly do so, any further 
unhappiness on either their 
part or mine and I think that 
it is better for the program 
if I do not have the 
responsibility to teach or 
grade them." 
Dean Messerman informed Prof. 
Sonenfield of the administration's 
"non-transferability of sections" 
policy. He communicated his under-
standing and respect for this 
administration policy and said he 
would make no further requests. 
The record is quite clear. Prof. 
Sonenfield has never refused to teach 
any students, whether minority, LCOP, 
or BALSA. In fact, it is one of his 
great characteristics that he treats 
all persons with the greatest of 
respect. 
Second, on October 6, BALSA demande 
Prof. Sonenfield's resignation. By 
their own admission, the students 
representing BALSA had not read the 
memorandum when they made their demand 
It seems incredible that law 
students would engage in such public 
defamation of character without 
having even checked the facts. 
Third, under the previous 
administration, first year LCOP 
students were given individual treat-
ment in class assignment. They were 
either assigned at their own request 
to certain pref erred professors or 
allowed to transfer to other 
professors of their choice. As a 
result, few LCOP students were place~ 
in Prof. Sonenfield's Property 
classes in the past three years. 
A more appropriate interpretatior 
of his memo would be that Prof. 
Sonenfield was seeking a 
continuation of the policies that 
had benefited LCOP students in the 
past. Far from seeking a termination 
of the program, he indicated the 
reason for the request was that: 
" ••• it is better for 
the program. • • ". (See page 9) 
Harllel Jones--ls he in Lucasville for aidinie 
3 
and abetting in murder, or for politics? 
By Gary Kelder 
Dear Friend: 
Harllel B. Jones (Harllel X) has 
~pent nearly four years in Ohio prisons 
for a crime he didn't commit. With 
your help, he may soon be free. 
Harllel Jones is a black man. 
He's 37 years old, married, and the 
father of two children. One March 28. 
1L972 he was convicted in the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas of aiding 
and abetting murder in the 
second degree and shooting with 
intent to kill or wound. A life 
sentence was imposed. 
Last year, as you may recall, the 
~ommutation of Harllel's sentence 
was considered by the Ohio Adult 
he Student Newspaper of The Cleveland State University 
[Ol ege of Law • Cleveland, Ohio······················· 
Parole Authority and the Governor. 
Commutation is defined in O.R.C. 
~967.01 (C). Simply stated, it 
~eans that the sentence is reduced 
to time served. Commutation is author-
Lzed when "there is reasonable ground 
~ o believe that ••• it would further the 
~~terests of justice and be consistent 
~ith the welfare and security of 
society," O.R.C. 2967.03. Innocence 
qualifies - even apparent innocence 
~ualifies. Harllel Jones qualifies. 
~t any rate, the parole authority 
did not favor commutation, and 
departing Governor Gilligan, although 
acknowledging that it was a close 
~ase, went along. The Governor did, 
however, direct that Harllel' s case 
be automatically reconsidered this 
year. So the parole authority is 
?resently conducting an investigation 
,f Harllel's case. Soon (in 
either December or January) it will be 
forwarding its recommendation to 
;overnor Rhodes. 
In the meantime, the ACLU of Greater 
Cleveland, acting together with 
Harllel's family and friends, has em-
barked upon a campaign to enlist com-
aunity support for the commutation of 
I · 
Harllel's sentence. I am asking you 
to assist that effort by registering 
your personal or group support. As 
members of Cleveland's legal community, 
your voices will be meaningfully heard. 
For the same reason, your voices 
.:>qould be heard. 
You're not being asked to support 
Harllel Jones' release because he is a 
f i ne person and an asset to the Cleve-
land community. These things are true, 
but you perhaps have no way of knowing 
that from personal knowledge. You' re 
being asked to support Harllel Jones 
The author is the attorney for 
Harllel Jones, and will represent him 
in a federal habeus corpus hearing 
recently granted by Frank Battisti, 
·chief Judge of the U.S. District Court 
here. Kelder is presently teaching law 
at the University of Syracuse, after 
three years on the Cleveland-Marshall 
faculty. 
judgment will be. Let me tell you why. 
because, as lawyers, future lawyers, 
and educators in the law, you are, 
perhaps moreso than others, in a 
position to render impartial judgment 
on the facts relevant to the manner 
in which Harllel Jones was convicted. 
I have no doubt as to what that 
Up to this point I have told you 
little about Harllel Jones. If I 
told you no more, I would be seriously 
remiss, for to fully understand why 
Harllel Jones must be freed, it is 
helpful, if not necessary, to know 
why Harllel Jones was chosen for his 
role in one of the most vicious 
prosecutions that this community has 
witnessed. You should know that 
Harllel Jones gained prominence in 
the Cleveland community in the 
latter part of the 1960's as the 
Prime Minister of the Afro-Set - an 
organization which counselled that 
pride, courage, discipline, unification, 
self-defense and community control of 
community businesses and institutions 
were the means of overcoming the 
yoke and brutality of racial and 
economic depression. You should note 
too, that in addition to mere 
prominence, Harllel Jones gained 
the respect of Cleveland's black 
community. You should be aware that 
he gained that respect, not as a 
comptroller of establishment largesse, 
and not as a rhetoritician who set 
himself up as a leader, but because 
he exercised leadership in his 
community and among its members - as 
a professor of progressive restraint 
and as a partition against official 
onslaught on the streets in Hough 
in 1966 and Glenville in 1968; as a 
moving force in the Cleveland Council 
of Churches; as chairperson of the 
Poor People's Partnership; and in 
Cleveland's Headstart program. It 
should be brought to your attention 
that Harllel Jones is attributed 
with having aided in making his 
community safe for businesses, fire-
persons, and utility service persons, 
and that he is attributed with having 
impacted upon local crime when the 
police could not. He was a true leader 
in the struggle for liberation. Conse-
quently, he was a threat. In turn, he 
became a target of oppression - the 
chosen subject of a sham prosecution. 
Now I sense that many of you are 
experiencing difficulty in following 
me to this conclusion. But be 
patient and listen further. You 
are perhaps thinking how was Harllel 
Jones a threat? What was there to 
fear from him? And how can it 
reasonably be said that it was Harllel 
Jones' political (not criminal) 
activity which prompted his 
conviction and incarceration? In a 
way I am at a loss in answering 
these questions, because limitations 
of space and considerations of 
relevancy prevent me from addressing 
what is perhaps (for some of you) the 
principal thrust of these questions -
i.e., was Harllel Jones really a 
threat and was he really to be feared? 
I can only tell you that in July 1970 
Harllel Jones was named as one of 
seven major "enemies" of Cleveland 
law enforcement by the then safety 
director. I can tell you that since 
early in 1968 Harllel Jones has 
been the target of extensive and 
continual secret service surveillance. 
I can tell you that the secret service 
was aided in its surveillance by 
the F.B.I. I can tell you that in 
August of 1967, f ormer F.B.I. director 
Hoover instituted a Counterintelligence 
program (COINTELPRO) which was 
designed and intended to "expose, 
disrupt, misdirect, discredit or 
otherwise neutralize black nation·-
alist ••. organizations, their 
leadership, spokesman, membership and 
supporters". I can tell you that 
the F.B.I. program was concerned 
with activity that fell far short 
of crime. I can tell you that the 
F.B.I. director instructed regional 
Page 4 
offices to the effect that "in unity 
there is strength; a truism that is 
no les~ valid for all its trite-
ness", and that "an effective 
coalition of black nationalist 
groups might be the first step toward 
the beginning of a true black 
revolution". I can tell you that 
Harllel Jones was the subject of 
COINTELPRO. I can tell you that 
F.B.I. agents were extensively 
involved in Harllel's prosecution, 
notwithstanding the fact that no 
possible federal crime was involved. 
In short, I can tell you with 
positive assurance that Harllel Jones 
was perceived as a threat, that he 
was feared, and that he was a likely 
candidate for malicious prosecution. 
I could go further, less assuringly, 
perhaps, and explain why Harllel Jones 
was really a threat and why his 
political activity caused him to be 
feared. But that shouldn't be 
necessary. In the past, we have 
all shared a naivete when it comes 
to underst&nding the machinations of 
power and the etiology of oppression. 
But we are wiser today - especially 
in the wake of Watergate and recent 
disclosures about the CIA, the F.B.I. 
and many others.We have learned to 
be vigilant in not underestimating 
the force of fear - be it rational 
or irrational. We no longer cling to 
the notion or belief (some never did) 
that the clear and present danger 
doctrine is an operational restraint 
upon governmental harassment, 
surveillance and suppression of 
political dissent. We are not without 
answers when asked why Richard Nixon 
imperiled constitutional order and 
liberty when he had the 1972 election 
sewed up. Having learned these 
things at the very least we cannot 
casually and lightly dismiss the 
assertion that Harllel Jones was 
prosecuted and imprisoned for activity 
other than that which would constitute 
a crime. So bear with me further 
and let me now tell you how it was 
done. 
Essentially, a criminal prosecution 
is a search for the truth, the 
discovery of which will determine 
whether a person is to be free or 
imprisoned. It is no wonder, then, that 
the Supremem Court has held that the 
"deliberate deception of a court 
and jurors by the presentation of 
known false evidence is incompatible 
with rudimentary demands of justice;" 
that "the same result obtains when 
the state, although not soliciting 
false evidence, allows it to go 
uncorrected when it appears;" that 
---;;;·-~~~··~·~·ii'""~;~··~i·;h···~·~~'i';i~~· .. ~·;~·~;~~~·; .. ·;~;-~~;i·i-;"i"'~~~·;~-·~~~···-···-·-· 
perceived as a threat, that he was feared, that he was prosecuted 
for his political activity." 
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this rule "does not cease to apply 
merely because the false testimony 
foes only to the credibility of the 
witness." (Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264 (1959)). 
It is equally no wonder that the 
Supreme Court has held "that the 
suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to the accused upon 
request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt 
or to punishment, irrespective of 
the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution." (Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963)). And it should 
come as no surprise that the ~upreme 
Court has cautioned prosecutors that 
a criminal prosecution is not a game 
to be won or lost and that, while 
they are free to strike hard blows, 
they must resist the temptation to 
strike foul blows. I ask you to 
keep these well settled propositions 
of law in mind as I recount for you 
the relevant facts of Harllel Jones' 
case. I ask you to judge whether 
the prosecution of Harllel Jones 
qualifies as a search for the truth 
and whether it can fairly be said 
that the truth was discovered. I 
ask you to determine if Harllel 
Jones was the recipient of foul 
blows. 
On the evening of August 6, 1970, 
a member of the Afro-Set, one Willie 
Lofton, was killed by a security 
guard at a McDonald's restaurant in 
Cleveland. The event provoked 
outrage in the community, and at the 
behest of the restaurant's owner, 
Harllel Jones appeared at the scene 
and calmed the crowd which had 
angrily gathered. His presence was 
attributed with having prevented 
further violence. But the peace was 
short-lived. In the early morning 
hours of August 7, 1970, four members 
of the Afro-Set occupied an auto-
mobile which was proceeding along the 
streets of downtown Cleveland. The 
driver and owner of the vehicle was 
one Marvin Bobo. Sitting next to 
him in the front seat was a man 
named Robert Perry. The back seat 
was occupied by James Moore and 
Victor Harvey. Harvey was fifteen 
years old. According to the testimony 
at Harllel's trial, these men were 
bent upon exacting retribution for 
the killing of Willie Lofton. So 
by their actions, a citizen of 
Cleveland was shot and killed while he 
was riding home. Another man was 
wounded. According to the trial 
testimony, all of the vehicles' 
occupants were armed. Bobo, however, 
was said to have been responsible 
for the fatal shooting, while Perry 
was noted to have been responsible 
for the wounding. As a practical 
matter, all were equally responsible, 
given established principals of 
complicity liability. 
A year later, in October 1971, 
Harllel Jones was indicted for these 
shootings. The charge was murder 
in the first degree and shooting with 
intent to kill or wound. Perry, Bobo, 
Moore and Harvey were similarly 
charged. All were arrested and 
detained. In the indictment it was 
alleged that after the incident at 
McDonald's Harllel called a meeting 
at which he gave an order to 
retaliate. It was further alleged 
that the shootings occurred pursuant 
to that order. Hence, Harllel was 
to be prosecuted as an aider and 
abettor, the others as principals. 
The trial did .not commence until 
March of 1972. However, during the 
intervening five months, several 
things happened which roust be 
mentioned. For instance, the AssistaD 
County P~osecutors, who were assigned 
to the case, moved for a joint trial. 
Under Ohio law, persons jointly 
indicted for a capital offense must 
be tried separately, except upon 
motion by the prosecutor shewing good 
cause for a joint trial (ORC 2945.20 
and Criminal Rule 14). Joint trials 
under such circumstances are rare 
because of the gravity of the offense 
and the need to avoid possible 
prejudice. Nevertheless, the 
prosecutor's motion was granted. On 
the matter of prejudice, the prosecute 
in support of the motion, asserted 
that the state did not intend to use 
statements obtained f.rom any of the 
co-def en<lants during custodial 
interro3ation. !1.emer1ber that. 
It s lioulc'. c.lso be noted that after 
:1e was arrested i:i October , 1971, 
.~rvey (by t~2n l G yec.rs ol<l) was 
interrozate<l by Cleveland homiciJe 
uetec tives. Touard t ;1e ead of 
October, 1971, and upon t~e 
recor:u:!endation of t i1c prosecutor, all 
cl-:ar:;es azainst ~:arvey were disuisse<l 
.:mJ he \las cleclareJ a naterial witness> 
for the state. Tl1.ese r.1a tters i;.;ere 
wi~ely publicized and it appeared 
that Harvey was to be a state witness. 
Then, in January, 1972, Harvey was 
interviewed by an investigator who 
had bee.fi assigned to Harllel's defense 
During the interview, Harvey told the 
investigator that when he was 
questioned by the police, he was 
asked if Harllel called a meeting, 
and he said no. He said he was 
asked if Harllel ordered the shootings 
and he said no. Now things looked 
different. Armed with this infor-
mation, Harllel's trial attorneys 
filed a pre-trial motion asking for 
the disclosure of Harvey's statement, 
under Brady v. Maryland. They 
claimed that the statement was 
favorable to Harllel Jones, and 
material to the issue of guilt. The 
prosecutor acknowledged that Harvey 
had been questioned, but denied that 
Harvey provided a statement which 
exculpated Harllel Jones. So things 
were back where they started. 
Finally I should point out that 
' I prior to the commencement of Harllel s 
trial, both Moore and Bobo plead 
guilty to murder in the second degree. 
Another co-defendant (who was 
charged as an aider and abettor and 
who I did not mention previously) 
waived trial by jury and his case 
was severed from Harllel's. Since 
the charges against Harvey had been 
dismissed, that left only Harllel 
and Robert Perry. Now just prior 
to jury selection, Harllel's defense 
attorney reiterated his opposition 
to a joint trial. Harllel's attorney 
had come to believe that Perry would 
be the state's witness at trial 
(at one of the sessions, where the 
attorneys for all the defendants met 
to discuss the case, Perry's attorney 
stated that it was not necessary 
for him to prepare a defense). The 
rial judge was therefore told 
hat it would constitute a "sham" to 
continue with the joint trial. In 
response, the prosecutor was. according 
to the Court of _Appeals, "evasive." 
He said that he didn't have to disclose 
~ho his witnesses would be. So the 
trial started. The prospective 
jurors were ass embled. Harllel and 
Perry were introduced to them as 
defendants and voir dire ensued', with 
Perry's counsel participating. Af ter 
' ,1proximately 24 jurors were examined, 
i 2rry waived a jury t r ial and his 
case was severed. Now Harllel Jones 
stood alone. 
At the trial, the prosecution's 
key witness was Robert Perry . He 
was the only witness, during the 
prosecution's cas e in chief, who 
supplied evidence linking Harll e l 
Jones to the cr imes . Without Perry, 
a motion to dismiss wa s a certainty , 
and the case would never hav e reached 
the jury. So his testimony was 
crucial to the state, and the jury 's 
estimate of his truthfulness and 
reliability was determinative of 
guilt or innocence. In short, it was 
upon such subtle factors as Perry 's 
possible interest in testifying falsely 
that Harllel's life or liberty 
depended . 
Perry testified, in pertinent 
part, as follows: that on 
the evening of August 6, 1970, 
Harllel called a mee ting and gave the 
order to retaliate; that he (Perry) 
rode in the murder car and participated 
in the shootings; that he first 
disclosed this information to F.B.I. 
agents in Columbus, Ohio, in August 
of 1971; that the provided the F.B.I. 
and Cleveland police officers (one 
from homicide, the other from the 
Cleveland Police Intelligence Unit) 
with a statement to the foregoing 
effect; that thereafter he worked for 
the F.B.I. on Harllel's case and 
on a different case; that he was 
r~imbursed by the F.B.I. for his 
expenses on as many as fifteen 
occasions in the total amount of 
approximately $600; that, the money 
aside, the F.B.I. did no favors for 
him in return for his assisting 
them; that he testified before the 
Cuyahoga grand jury in October of 
1971; that no promise of leniency 
had been made to him in return for 
his testimony; and that he was 
told only that his testimony would 
be taken into consideration in 
determining what would happen with 
the first degree murder charge 
which was pending against him. 
Victor Harvey , who you will recall 
was declared a material witness for 
the state, was not called to testify 
at the trial. The remaining two eye 
witnesses were, of course, Moore and 
Bobo. Moore declined to testify. 
Bobo testified for Harllel. In his 
testimony Bobo stated that it was he 
who directed the retaliation and that 
Harllel Jones knew nothing about it. 
On March 28 , 197 2 , the jury r e turned 
a verdic t of guil t y . Har l lel wasn ' t 
convicted of first degree murder, so 
his life was spared. Spared? There 
may be a better word. Harllel was 
convicted of second degree murder and 
deprived of his freedom - for life. 
Up to this point I have recited 
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Finally, you ask, did Perry lie or 
misrepresent the facts when he denied 
that he had been promised leniency? 
When he said that his first contact 
with law enforcement agents (F.B.I. 
and Cleveland Police) was in August of 
1971? When he said that, aside from 
the money, he received no favors 
from the F.E.I. In other words, was 
the jury apprised of all of the 
facts which had a bearing on Perry's 
credibility and thus (given the 
fact that Perry was the key witness) 
on the truth of what had occurred? 
Now, I don't propose to answer 
these questions for you. You will 
remember that I am seeking your 
judgment; so you must answer these 
questions for yourself. I can, 
however, help by supplying you with 
additional facts and inferences (which, 
I am confident, you are able to 
identify and treat accordingly) that 
will aid you in your task. Let me 
proceed to do this by taking your 
questions in the order presented. 
First - the motion for joint trial. 
Did the prosecutor know when he moved 
for a joint trial that Perry would 
be his witness? Well, he had no 
other witness, and it was Perry who 
testified before the grand jury. And 
I suppose you should know that on 
March 31, 1972 (three days after 
Harllel was convicted) the prosecutor 
stated in open court (on the record) 
that without Perry noone would have 
been indicted - including Harllel 
Jones. Was Harllel Jones prejudiced 
by the joint trial motion? By the 
fact that this permitted Perry's 
attorney to participate in the voir 
dire? And by the fact that Perry was 
consequently introduced to the 
prospective jurors as a co-defendant? 
Well, here you should know that certain 
of the prospective jurors to whom 
Perry was initially introduced 
remained on the jury. I suppo s e too, 
that you would be right in asking -
would the trial judge have granted the 
joint trial motion if it had been 
made known to him that Perry would 
be the state's witness? Was the court 
........... _______________________________ ,_ ......................... .. 
"Prejudice to the case would most certainly occur when the only 
remaining co- defendant , rises from the defense table and proceeds to 
the side of the s tate and then commences to tel l the j ury , implicitly 
but with unmis takable impact, that a plea of not guilty and the 
presumption of innocence ar e r ather meaningles s as sumptions ." 
.................. -........... ,_,,, __ , _______ _ 
certain basic recor d facts which have 
relevance to t he legal principals that 
I asked yQu to bear in mind. If you 
have followed me this far, you are 
full of questions. You ask, for 
example: Since the prosecutor must 
have known that Perry would be the 
state's witness (after all, Perry 
supplied a statement in August of 1971 
and he testified before the grand jury 
in October 1971) was it proper to 
move for joint trial of Perry and 
Harllel Jones? Was it proper for him 
t o allow Perry's attorneys to 
participate in group sessions? Was 
it proper for him to allow Perry to 
be introduced to the prospective 
jurors as a co-defendant? Was it 
proper for him to have permitted 
Perry's attorney to participate in 
voir dire? Could this have prejudiced 
Harllel's right to a fair trial? 
Was this a foul blow? You also ask: 
What did Harvey tell the police about 
Harllel when he was interrogated? 
Did he really tell them that Harllel 
was not involved? And if so, was 
that information, so important to 
the determination of the truth, 
suppressed by the prosecutor when it 
was requested by Harllel's attorneys? 
--------------------······· 
deceived? You should also know that 
the voir dire stage is somewhat 
preoccupied with informing the 
prospective jurors that defendants 
are presumed innocent, having plead 
not guilty, and that the prosecution 
bears the heavy burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Finally, I suppose you should know 
what any experienced criminal defense 
attorney knows - that the time-honored 
presumption of innocence occupies a 
precarious station in the day to day 
conduct of criminal trials and that 
prejudice to the case of his client 
would most certainly occur, by 
reason of the devastation of this 
presumption as well as the corollary 
and equally elusive concept of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, when the 
only remaining co-defendant, who 
like his client is cloaked with the 
presumption due to a plea of not 
guilty, rises from the defense table 
and proceeds to the side of the state 
and then commences to tell the jury, 
implicitly but with unmistakable 
impact, that a plea of not guilty 
and the presumption of innocence 
are rather meaningless assertions . 
You must decide. Was this a foul blow? 
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"The Afro- Set lawyer was dazzled. He thought that he must 
have done a great job. Now he wonders." 
Now, about Victor Harvey. Did 
Harvey provide the Cleveland police 
with a statement which exonerated 
Harllel Jones? Well, since Harllel 
was convicted, Harvey has said on 
two occasions (in affidavits) that he 
did. And you should know that the 
investigation conducted on Harllel's 
behalf has revealed an eye witness who 
corroborates Harvey's account. Did 
the prosecutor know? The prosecutor 
acknowledge in open court that Harvey 
was interrogated. And he knew by whom 
Harvey was interrogated. Furthermore, 
the Cleveland homicide detectives who 
questioned Harvey were extensively 
involved in the case; their presence 
was observed on numerous occasions 
in the courtroom at the trial. And 
wasn't Harvey the prosecutor's material 
witness? Now you decide. Was the truth 
suppressed? 
That brings me to Robert Perry. 
There's alot that you should know about 
Perry. Let me start back in 1968. Perry 
was then living in Columbus, Ohio, and 
he was not exactly a law-abiding citizen. 
He was charged with assault and 
battery on his wife and torturing his 
child (the record would seem to 
indicate that these charges were 
dismissed, in part because ..• ); he 
was convicted of forgery (a felony) in 
1968 and placed on probation under the 
supervision of the adult probation 
department for Franklin County. While 
living in Columbus and while on 
probation, Perry became a member of the 
Afro-Set chapter there. At Harllel's 
trial, he said that he "investigated" 
the Afro-Set before he joined.(?) 
In the spring of 1970, Perry's 
probation officer was informed that 
Perry was involved with black militants 
in Columbus and that he was carrying a 
weapon. This information was supplied 
by the Columbus Police Intelligence 
Unit. Shortly thereafter, around 
April of 1970, Perry stopped showing 
up for his meetings with his probation 
officer. In fact, he left Columbus 
(without permission) and travelled to 
Cleveland. In legal parlance, he 
absconded. When he ar.rived in 
Cleveland, he joined the Afro-Set and 
befriended, or was befriended by, 
Harvin Bobo. 
Perry was told to come back to 
Columbus. So he did. But before 
he "surrendered" himself to probation 
officials, Perry. called the Prime 
Minister of the Afro-Set in 
Columbus. Ile explained that he was 
in trouble on his probation and asked 
for legal assistance. The Prime 
Minister contacted the Afro-Set's 
lawyer in Columbus, and arranged for 
Perry to be interviewed. When Perry 
met with the Columbus attorney, he 
was informed of the gravity of his 
situation - i.e. that he would probably 
spend some time in jail until his 
story was checked out, and that quite 
possibly his probation would be revoked. 
In the early morning hours of August 
7, 1970, as you recall, Perry and Bobo, 
along with Moore and Harvey, participat-
ed in ~he killing for which Harrlel was 
convicted. In January of 1971, about 
nine months after he absconded, the 
Franklin County Probation Department 
issued a warrant for Perry's arrest 
as a probation violator . His 
probation was thereupon suspended. 
Several months later, around March of 
1971, Perry called the Columbus 
probation officials from Cleveland. He 
told them that he had a job in Cleve-
land, that he was instituting 
divorce proceedings, that he wanted 
to marry again, that he was involved 
in an automobile accident and was 
expecting a settlement with which he 
would pay court costs and restitution 
expenses flowing from his forgery 
conviction, and that he wanted to 
come back to Columbus. The Cleveland 
attorney who was handling Perry's 
accident claim also called the 
probation department to corroborate 
Perry's account. 
Perry seemed unconcerned. Together, 
the Columbus attorney and Perry then 
paid a visit to Perry's probation 
officer. It was a short visit. The 
result - Perry was told that every-
thing was okay and that he could return 
to Columbus. The warrant was with-
drawn. So was the order of suspension, 
and no extended term of probation was 
imposed. The Afro-Set's lawyer was 
dazzled. He thought that he must 
have done a great job. Now he wonders. 
Perry never told him about the prior 
communication with the probation 
officials from Cleveland. 
Now, according to Perry's trial 
testimony, about five months after his 
probation was restored and in August 
of 1971 he had his first contact with 
law enforcement agents (namely the 
F.B.I.) in reference to Harllel's 
case. This occurred in Columbus. 
Again, according to his testimony, 
Perry is supposed to have sort of 
come in off the street and related 
to the agents in Columbus how he 
had participated in a killing in 
Cleveland a year before and how he 
did this pursuant to an order given 
by Harllel Jones. Okay, so Perry 
admitted to agents of the F.B.I. and 
Cleveland police officers that he was 
involved in a murder. Was he arrested? 
No. Are admitted murderers usually 
arrested? Well, yes, but, as Perry 
testified, he then started working for 
the F.B.I. on Harllel's case and on 
a "different case." He did this up 
until the time he was jailed in 
October 1971 - a period of about two 
months. Also during this interim, Perry 
was supposedly reimbursed for his 
"expenses" on as many as fifteen 
occasions in a total amount of 
approximately $600. He was pretty 
busy. 
Now let me take a breath. Let me 
also back up a bit. You'll recall 
that at Harllel's trial Perry said 
that his first contact with the 
F.B.I. was in August of 1971, and that 
aside from the money he received 
no other favors from the F.B.I. Well, 
consider what I have just related to 
you along with the following. First, 
consider that when he admitted his 
involvement in murder, Perry was stil 
on probation in Columbus. His term 
wasn't due to expire until November 
of 1971. You can imagine that this 
could get sort of sticky, expecially 
since Perry's probation record was 
hardly exemplary. So in September of 
1971, Perry went to see his probation 
officer. According to the probation 
officer, at this meeting Perry 
experienced difficulty in explaining 
that he was involved "in important 
work for the government, primarily 
in the Cleveland, Ohio area." So he 
left and came back with an F.B.I. 
agent who told the probation officer 
that Perry "was doing some special 
work for his agency within the Afro-
Set in Cleveland and in Columbus". 
But what was the purpose for the call 
Well, the F.B.I. agent requested that 
Perry's probation status be continued 
until the completion of his assign-
ment. Now - you are asking. wasn't 
this a state case? So why was Perry 
on an F.B.I. assignment? If Perry's 
first contact with the F.B.I. was in 
August, 1971, why did he say that 
he was doing important governmental 
work "primarily" in Cleveland? In 
a period of one month, could he have 
bee~ on assignment someplace else 
also? And if Perry just came in off 
the street and spilled the beans, 
why did the F.B.I. agent say that 
Perry was working "within" the Afro-
Set? And didn't the agent say within 
the Afro-Set in Columbus, too? These 
are good questions, and I'm glad to s 
you're still with me. So read on, 
read on. 
Perry was indicted with everyone 
else in October of 1971. After that, 
and still in October, 1971, two F.B.I. 
agents paid a visit to the Chief of 
the Probation Department in Columbus, 
Ohio. They told the chief that 
Perry was their informant or plant who 
had infiltrated a black militant 1 
organization in Cleveland. Informant 
Plant? Infiltrated? Yes. They told 
the chief that Perry was to be their 
star witness (their witness? Yes) in 
an upcoming trial and requested that 
his probation not be revoked. (Was 
that a favor?) They also requested 
that Perry's probation status be 
continued (remember, he was to be 
discharged in November 1971) so that 
it would appear when he testified 
that probation revocation was still 
hanging over him. (Does that sound 
like a search for the truth?) The 
chief complied. 
Now, as I told you before, after 
the indictments were handed down, 
Perry was arrested along with every-
body else who was indicted. Unlike 
everyone else, however, Perry was 
not confined in the Cuyahoga County 
Jail. Instead, he was kept in Lake 
County and Geauga County. 
I probably should also point out that 
Perry wasn't always kept in jail. 
Remember, he had instituted a divorce 
proceeding. The hearing had been 
rescheduled on the court's calendar 
(Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations) 
a number of times. It was finally 
scheduled for March 15, 1972 (a 
couple weeks before Perry testified). 
In fact, it was scheduled for March 15 
1972 for a particular reason - you see 
that was the day that the homicide 
detective, who was working on 
Harllel's case, had off. So on that 
day, two homicide detectives escorted 
Perry from the jail to the Domestic 
Relations Court for the divorce 
proceeding. Perry was represented by 
legal aid attorney. The proceeding 
took place in chambers, and when it 
was over, the judge took the matter 
under advisement. Then,the 
····-······-··························-····················-···-·--··-----
·----·----···----... ·---·----·--
"Three days after HarUel was convicted, an admitted participant in 
rrrurder, Robert Perry, was the r ecipient of a nolle prosequi entered 
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seeking commutation, efforts to 
vindicate the violation of his 
constitutional rights in the courts 
have not ceased. At the moment, 
Harllel's case is pending in federal 
court on a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. His conviction is 
being challenged on nine separate 
grounds - only three of which have 
been addressed by the foregoing. 
on his behalf to the charge of first degree murder." 
·······························-··-····-·····-···-·······--··-··-----···--·-·-··-·----···-·························-··············-····-
detectives asked the legal aid attorney 
to wait with Perry (uncuffed through-
out and now unguarded) outside while 
they .spoke with the judge. The at-
torney who was aware of the ap-
parent jeopardy that Perry was in as 
an indicted murderer and all that) 
was unable to resist inquiring about 
the matter of security. The response 
was, as the attorney recalls, that 
there was no cause for concern. In-
deed. (treat my indeed as you will). 
The rest you know - that is, what ha-
ppened at the trial. So let's 
skip over that and turn to March 31, 
1972 (three days after Harllel was 
convicted ) . On that day, an admitted 
participant in murder, Robert Perry, 
was the recipient of a nolle prosequi 
entered on his behalf to the charge of 
first degree murder. Pursuant to the 
law,of course, the nolle was entered 
by a Common Pleas Court judge upon 
the recommendation of the prosecutor. 
Now you must decide - is there 
reasonable ground to believe that 
Perry expected that treatment? Was it 
arranged in advance of his testimony? 
Ifso, would the jury have been aided 
inassessing his credibility had they 
known the truth? 
Perhaps I can supply you with a few 
more facts. I would point out that 
Perry's probation was never revoked. 
And, as you recall, the Columbus 
probation officials were requested by 
the F. B. I. to continue Perry's 
probation status until the completion of 
his assignment. You remember why? 
Now consider the fact that Perrywas 
finally and oficially discharged 
from probation on March 24, 1972 -h¥o 
days after he testified. You 
might also want to know what happened 
to Perry after he was 
released. Well, for awhile he 
disappeared. He surfaced in Columbus 
inearly 1973. He was then charged, 
by indictment, with the crime of 
assault with a deadly weapon (a felony). 
On March 15, 1973, Perry appeared in 
the Franklin County Court of Corrunon 
Pleas and plead guilty to a lesser 
included offense - carrying a concealed 
weapon. He had subpoenaed witnessesto 
appear on his behalf on that date. 
One such witness was the Chief of the 
Columbus Police Intelligence Unit. 
The former chief of the Franklin 
County Adult Probation Department 
recalls seeing the Columbus Intelligence 
Chief in the courtroom that day. He 
recalls further that the Intelligence 
Chief was perturbed with Perry. He 
recalls too that the Intelligence 
Chief explained how the F. B. I. had set 
Perry up outside the State of Ohio 
when he was released by Cuyahoga 
County officials back in March of 
1972, and that Perry hadn't exercised 
sound judgment by returning to 
Columbus. He recalls finally that the In-
telligence Chief indicated thathe 
still felt obliged to help Perry 
because of his (Perry's) prior 
cooperation. You continue to plague me 
with questions. Now you ask: Why did 
Perry subpoena the head of the 
Columbus Intelligence Unit? Had Perry 
been an informant in Columbus 
too? Is that why the F.B.I. agent 
told Perry's probation officer back 
in September of 1971 that Perry was working 
within the Afro-Set in 
Cleveland and Columbus? If so, 
shouldn't the jury have been told? And if 
Perry had his first contact with the 
F.B.I. in August of 1971 and was 
jailed two months later, how could he 
have also worked as an informant in 
Columbus? After all, he was a member 
of the Afro-Set in Columbus back in 
1970 before he absconded from 
probation and even before the killing 
occurred? (!!!) Then too, if Perry's 
first contact with the F.B.I. on a 
purely state case had been in August 
of 1971, why would the F.B.I. relocate 
him? Was he that important to them? 
And if so, wouldn't Perry have known 
this? Shouldn't the jury have know 
this? Once again, your questions 
are good ones. But you must decide. 
I have provided you with the facts. I 
ask for your judgment. 
But I did forget one fact. You of 
course want to know what happened to 
Perry when he plead guilty to carrying 
a concealed weapon. What do you 
think happened? Perry had been 
convicted of a felony in 1968; he 
absconded from earlier probation; he 
admitted participating in a murder 
in Cleveland (although he was not 
prosecuted) and he was charged with 
a new felony and was pleading guilty 
to a lesser included offense. As a 
point of comparison, I would point 
out that Harllel Jones has been 
convicted as an adult only once, and 
you are reading about that. Harllel 
is, of course, confined for life. So 
what do you think happened to Perry? 
He was placed on probation. The judge 
took into account the fact that the 
pre-sentence report noted that Perry 
had testified on behalf of the 
prosecution on various occasions. 
Various occasions? But, you say -
I thought Perry had only testified 
against Harllel? The jury wasn't 
told of any other cases in which he 
testified? Indeed. But the judge 
said various occasions. Any now you 
must decide. Was Harllel's prosecution 
a search for the truth? Was the jury 
apprised of all the facts which had 
a bearing on Perry's credibility? 
Before closing, I would mention 
that while Harllel Jones is presently 
I would further mention that Harllel 
Jones has yet to receive an evidentiary 
hearing on the matters which I have 
related to you. Hence, some of the 
preceding facts are not of record. 
Rather, they are the product of an 
investigation which has been 
diligently conducted on Harllel's 
behalf. The struggle in the courts 
will go forward - it can however be 
obviated if you will help - now. 
At the outset I stated that Harllel 
Jones has spent nearly four years in 
prison for a crime he didn't corrunit. 
I've tried to explain. I said with your 
help, he could soon be free. I've 
told you how. If you feel and if you 
determine that the prosecution of 
Harllel Jones was not a search for the 
truth, and that there is reasonable 
ground to believe that the truth was 
not established; and if, in your 
judgment, the interest of justice 
would be furthered by his release, make 
your determination known to the people 
at the ACLU, and they will forward it 
to the Parole Board. 
I realize that I have taken your time 
and that I ask for even more of your 
time. B~t alot is at stake. Harllel 
Jones has been deprived of alot of 
time, his liberty is at stake. You 
may even feel that our liberty is at 
stake. You'd be right. 
Thank you for listening. 
Cor-1'11 TIEE OF 1000 REsoLUT ION 
( AooPTED 4 Ml\RCH 1975 BY THE s I BI A I ) 
(Since the Committee of lOOO is gaining in use and importance, 
we reprint, be low, its pertinent sections--ed.) 
i'-.;~ i·:.:~l·L 
The•r: ~,i1a!I h2 ~1 s\c; r1d1r.g corr.1 0iH00 frn'.)v.; n .::s ti 1P. Comn1!:tee of 1000, '/v hi ch Ghall be corn· 
p8sed oi ell studeri:s of Cle.,,e ic;rici-Marshail Co!: ege c>! Law . 
/~ diciG n. 
Ser; ti on 1. T'ie C0::-i :r. it!cc ~. ~ciil h G\'2 power :o do e ll thin9s within the Gompcter1cc 
'...~ 8.1'. exc·2;; i for - --
(1) matte rs 1equ irin 9 the Gppropri c-,tion of rr:on ey or incurring of debt. 
(2) amendr'1ents o: t~'G S.B./\ Con::::itut ion or By-l am;. or 
(3) di scipline (; f S. 8./\. rn1?rn be rs. 
which subjec1s siiall require rat ;1icGtion by '.h e S.B.A. 
of the 
Sect ion 2. In cases wh ere t11e Con:mitlee desires l o appropria te money or incur debt and the 
E: .. 8 .A. withholds its consent; tt1e C0mmitt ce rnny submit the issue to cin elect ion of the 
studen t body, which eiectiori sha l l be by ballo t. 
Article Ill. 
Secti on I. The Committ 3e shall meet :';Cmi-montt1ly, except summer term, at a time oeter-
mined by the S.8.A. 
Sectio11 2. Srecial rn er.: 1i;ig:, uf the Cornrnittee rn"'.!y be called by-
(1) tr10 S.8 .A . p; es i~~: , : . 
(2) a majority of the S.B.A. offi ce rs, 
(3) th G S.8 .A. or . 
(4) twenty-five Committ•?e m2mbers by a petition submitted to an S.B.A. officer, who sh~.i i 
c0nvene the Committee within seven days _ 
Section 3. The purpose of special meetings shall be stated in the call, but other business may 
be transacted. 
Article IV. 
Section 3. ·The Committee may make and enforce rules for the transaction of business and 
conduct of members. 
Section 4. Twen!~'-five CommittPe members sh al l constitute a quorum to do bus iness. ~u t a 
less2r number rnay adjourn from day io day 
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Here Comes The Sun 
new oliio rtatute will open 
meetinyr of tlecirion-maliny /Jotlier 
By Bruce Wick 
On November 28, the so-calle<l 
Sunshine Law, Amended Substitute 
Senate Bill 74, takes effect, 
replacing the present Section 121.22 
O.R.C. The bill's purpose is to 
sweep away the vestiges of secrecy 
in the government. To this end, 
the bill is far-reaching, compre-
hensive, and innovative. If the 
effects of the Act are somewhat less 
than hoped, this may result from the 
surprisingly fragmented nature of 
state government and the immunity of 
the fragments to control by the 
legislature. 
THE B I LL I TS ELF 
In Section (A) of the new O.R.C. 
121.22, the General Assembly ask~ that 
their Act "be liberally construed to 
require public officials to take 
official action and to conduct all 
deliberations upon official business 
only in open meetings, unless the 
subject matter is specifically 
excepted by law." 
The operative section of the bill, 
Section ( C) , is quite short: "All 
meetings of any public body are declared 
to be public meetings open to the 
public at all times." "Public boJy" 
is defined as 
1. any board 
2. cormnission 
1. state agency 
OF A 2. institution, 
3. committee, or 
4. similar decision-
making body 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
any legisla-
tive 
authority, or 
AND 
board, OF ANY 
commission, 
committee, 
agency, 
authority, or 
similar decision-
making body 
or 
3. authority 
4. county 
5. township 
6. municipal 
corp. 
7. school 
district 
8. other 
political 
subdivision, 
or 
9. local public 
institution 
' ., 
·'· · .. ;._ " 
·' 1 ·~ -:· . 
... 
.::- ' ..£7>"1!> i;ffi\.:. '.:~ ._,,, .. ~Aj1.+.t.~~{::r,',"..J.~.. •· .• :::····- . -<::·:·· ... ···· 
... ·, ",:u£fi~4J ti\~ ~~)~~i'1\~• , ._ . ' > ···. -- -- --
. •, .. 
•. ' 
A "meeting" is "any prearranged 
discussion of the public business of 
the public body by a majority of its 
members." The definitions of "meeting" 
and "public body" must be read 
together to understand their cumu-
lative effect. A body need not be a 
"public body" to be subject to the 
Act. If it includes a majority of 
the members of a "public body" who 
have convened to discuss the public 
business of that body, the gathering 
will be treated as if it were the 
"public body," legally assembled. 
The phrase "prearranged discussion 
of the public business" includes 
several elements which may appear 
difficult to prove. Yet in 
proceedings involving Section (H) of 
the Act (discussed under the heading 
"s . ") anctions , where the validity of 
public acts is challenged for 
violation of the statute's procedures; 
judges and juries si~ply may not 
believe that meetings of three or 
more members occurred by chance, or 
that a discussion of public business 
. , 
if is occurred, was not intended. 
Furthermore, judge or jury may be 
permitted to inf er from the mere fact 
of the meeting itself that public 
business was considered, absent 
evidence to the contrary (which may 
not be believed in any event). 
The expansive definition of 
"meeting" renders suspect any 
informal gathering of a majority 
(i.e., a half plus one) of any 
governmental body. 
Harmony? 
The abuse the statute aims at is 
the pre-meeting "ca ·us" (Algonquian, 
for secret meeting),_ the members, 
or enough of them, usually a 
majority, to constitute a quorum 
had there been a legal meeting. In 
many supposedly public bodies, all 
substantial decisions are made in 
private. All candid discussion takes 
place in private. Members work out 
compromises between competing 
points of view and preserve a facade 
of unity for public consumption--all 
in private. 
The formal meetings are thus 
emptied of meaning and purpose; 
they become dull ritual. There is no 
debate; the whole evening's business 
may be put to a single vote. Bliss-
ful harmony prevails, at least in 
appearance; but press and public are 
no more enlightened about the 
reasons behind particular decisions 
than if they had stayed at home. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Act expressly excepts from its 
coverage several governmental bodies: 
--Grand Juries 
--The Adult Parole Authority "when 
... Library woes (From page 1) its hearings are conducted at a penal institution for the sole 
purpose of interviewing inmates to 
determine parole or pardon." 
The acquisitions budgets for the four 
state supported schools in Ohio for 
1975-76 are: Ohio State, $157,000; 
Toledo, $103,000; Akron, $100,000; 
and Cleveland-Marshall, $96,000. 
These figures show even more disparity 
when considered in light of respective 
student body size. For purposes of 
comparison, a school's student body 
is represented by FTE (full-time 
E;quivalent), which is computed by 
counting full-time students as one 
and part-time (including evening) 
students as 2/3. In 1974-75 Ohio 
state had an FTE of 650, Toledo of 
720, Akron of 461 and Cleveland-
Marshall of 900. 
Another comparative category which 
puts Cleveland-Marshall at the bottom 
of the list of all Ohio schools is 
total book volumes per FTE student. 
As of the start of the 1974-75 fiscal 
year Ohio State had 500 volumes 
available per student, more than twice 
that of the next school, Cincinnati, 
which had 242. Akron had 224 volumes 
available, Toledo 116 and Cleveland-
Marshall came in eighth out of 
eight with 94 volumes available per 
student. 
C-M v. CSU 
Not only has the law library come 
out last in state disbursements to 
law schools; it also follows in 
disbursements to the CSU main 
library. For the past two years 
both libraries have received special 
subsidy funds, but while the law 
library's budget was cut from 
$109,800 to $60,000 in 1975, the 
main library's budget was cut from 
$429,523 to $406,300. More 
importantly, the main library has 
received consistent increases in its 
subscription maintenance budget 
while the law library's maintenance 
budget was cut $32,000 in 1975. The 
materials that were listed in the 
first paragraph of this article 
were cancelled because of 
insufficient funds in the law library's 
maintenance budget. 
Law students can expect one more 
reduction in library services come 
January, Law Librarian Bardie Wolfe 
said, unless the library receives 
some unlooked-for help. In 
January, the library will cut its 
hours of operation another 11 hours 
per week because it can't afford to 
pay for the staff required to keep 
it open. 
The budget cuts and unequal treat-
ment of the law library raises serious 
questions, at least in this reporter's 
mind, as to what the State of Ohio 
intends to do with Cleveland-Marshall. 
--Certain meetings of the Ohio 
Development Financing Connnission. 
In addition, several other exceptions • 
are implied. These include organs of 
the judicial branch, notably: juries, 
the deliberations of multi-judge courts, 
and in camera conferences between 
attorneys and judges. Three bases for 
a judicial exemption can be found in 
the Ohio Constitution. 
(See next page) 
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--Section 5 of the Bill of Rights 
declares that "[t]he right of trial 
by jury shall be inviolate .••• " 
Implicit in the concept of the jury 
is secret deliberations. A jury, 
after all, is not supposed to respond 
to popular pressures, except in the 
most general way: that it embody and 
reflect the attitudes of the 
community on matters of importance. 
There is surely a difference between 
requiring the public taking of 
evidence and requiring that judges 
or jurors deliberate under the 
glare of television lights in a 
courtroom packed with supporters of 
one side or the other. 
--Article IV, Section 5(B) confers 
upon the Supreme Court and inferior 
courts rule-making power over 
"practice and procedure." Acting 
under this constitutional grant, 
the courts may already have 
secured the privacy of their 
deliverations. (See, for example, 
Civil Rules 38(a), 47(C), and 48.) 
--The courts, as a coordinate branch 
of government, may well possess 
inherent power to regulate practice, 
procedure and like matters; just as 
it is sometimes said that a court 
established by the constitution has 
inherent power to punish for 
contempt, unaided by any statute. 
Certain municipal corporations, 
also impliedly may be excepted. As 
noted earlier, the all-important 
definition of "public body" includes 
every imaginable deliberative assembly 
within a municipal corporation. But 
under the Ohio Constitution, the 
Act may not apply to charter muni-
cipalities at all. (See Beacon Journal 
Publishing Co. v. City of Akron, 3 
Ohio St. 2d 191 (1965); Dayton News-
paper, Inc., v. City of Dayton, 28 
Ohio App. (2d)95(1971) affirming 23 
Ohio Misc. 49 (CP, 1970).) 
Considering the salutary purpose 
of the Sunshine Act, perhaps the 
courts should strain to make it 
apply to charter municipalities, 
which are, after a sizable chunk of 
state government. The new Section 
121.22 and municipal laws which 
expressly (or by implication) allow 
for secret meetings could be seen as 
conflicting exercises of the "police" 
power--in this case the regulation of 
public morals--a conflict in which 
the general state statute must prevail. 
Right to See 
Who would now doubt that the 
conduct of government officials can 
have a debilitating effect on "the 
morals of the people"? Citizens 
may answer the fear and arrogance 
which thev believe governmental 
secrecy represents with a disrespect 
of their own verging on open contempt--
not only for the officials personally, 
but for their laws as well. 
... SBA (from page one ) 
The Guild's second project, at 
$250, will be a newsletter to the 
school and community on current 
legal issues. 
The Women's Caucus received 
$1,520, from which $145 will pay 
the expenses of their special 
orientation for first-year women. 
They are also planning a movie 
series, at $125, and seminar on 
the problems of women seeking 
employment in law, at $300. 
In other business, the SBA agreed 
tentatively to fund $815 from its 
speakers budget, for travel 
expenses for Pat Anderson, who is 
National Director of Community 
Services for BALSA. However, a 
committee of five SBA and five 
BALSA members was set up to 
explore alternate sources. 
The decision to conduct the public 
business secretly and without record 
is not a matter of "organization," 
like the size of city council; still 
l e ss is it a procedural matter, like 
the number and length of speeches 
or decorum in debate. It strikes 
at the heart of popular government, 
or perhaps more accurately, at its 
eyes and ears. Without the ability 
to see--to scrutinize official 
conduct, to choose between the 
c ompeting alternatives which public 
debate ma y r e veal, the people are 
helpless before their own officialdom. 
They have surrendered their will, 
p e rhaps their very lives to their 
governors; and like the patient on 
the ope rating table, they must hope 
for the best. 
EXECUTI VE SESS ION S 
The term "executive session" derives 
from the practice of the U.S. Senate 
in considering executive business, 
that is, treaties and nominations 
proposed by the President of the 
United States. Senate rules 36 to 
39 distinguish between "open" and 
"closed" executive sessions. But 
under the Sunshine Act, as in common 
parlance, an executive session means 
a secret session. Also, unlike the 
Senate rules, executive sessions 
under the new 121.22 O.R.C. apply only 
to deliberations, that is, to debate 
upon certain sensitive subjects. The 
acts of a public body, on the other 
hand, must always be done in open 
session, regardless of the delicacy 
attending the subject matter. 
Section (H) of the bi l l is quite 
clear about this, as are the comments 
of the Legislative Service Commission. 
... Letter (From page 2) 
Fourth, Prof. Sonenfield is one 
of the finest teachers in this law 
school. He is always prepared to 
teach, concerned that Etudents learn 
and willing to give as much time 
outside the classroom as a student 
needs or wants. Any student in 
any of his courses who has requested 
held has received it. 
We do not want Prof. Sonenfield's 
resignation. We want him to be 
allowed to return to his primary 
duty and devotion--teaching the law--
without continual distractions that 
can serve no useful purpose to the 
law school. 
Cleveland-Marshall's reputation 
is not enhanced when these unsubstan-
iated and untrue accusations are 
made to the press and when the 
administration dignifies the matter 
with the time, procedures and 
verbiage which have been devoted 
to it. 
Freedom of speech means more than 
the right to express one's opinion. 
It means the right to espouse a 
controversial opinion without fear 
of authoritative sanctions. 
Christina s. Hartwig 
Sharon Nantell 
William Carrell 
Robert Straus 
Executive sessions may be held to 
discuss the following subjects, all 
of which are strictly construed: 
1. the appointment 1. public employee, 
2. employment or 
3. dismissal OF A 2. official 
4. discipline 
5. promotion 
6. demotion, or 
7. compensation 
OR 
1. the investi- 1. public 
gation of AGAINST A employee 
charges, or 2. official, 
2. complaints 3. licensee, 
or 
4. regulated 
individual 
UNLESS 
such person requests a public hearing. 
("Regulated individuals," by the way, 
include students in the public schools 
and universities, as well as the 
residents of state prisons, hospitals, 
nursing homes, etc.) 
Furthermore, executive sessions may 
be held regarding: 
--In certain cases, the purchase and 
sale of public property. 
--Conference between the public body 
and its attorney concerning pending 
or imminent litigation. 
--Collective bargaining negotiations. 
--Matters required to be kept secret 
by state or federal law. 
--"Specialized details of security 
arrangements," where their disclosure 
would aid or abet the commission of 
crime. The stated purpose of this 
phrase is to require that general 
principles of public policy relating 
to law enforcement or protection 
against crime--such as the type of 
weaponry in use or contemplated--be 
discussed in public. 
SANCTI ONS 
1. Criminal Penalties. Criminal 
penalties were eliminated from the 
bill as adopted. However, O.R.C. 
2921.44(B) doubtless applies to 
violations of the Act: 
No public servant shall 
recklessly fail to perform a 
duty expressly imposed by law 
with respect to his office, 
or recklessly do any act 
expressly forbidden by law 
with respect to his office. 
Violation of this section is a 
"dereliction of duty," a misdemeanor 
of the second degree, punishable by 
imprisonment up to 90 days or a 
fine of up to $750, or both. 
2. Injunctions. "Upon proof of 
a violation or threatened violation" 
of the Act, the Court of Common 
Pleas shall issue an injunction to 
compel the members of the public 
body to comply ••• " Such civil 
actions may be brought by "any 
person." No special standing is 
necessary to sue; anyone can demand 
that violations of this law be 
brought to a halt. Apparently, 
the individual members of the 
public body are the proper 
defendants in the action, not the 
public body as an entity. But 
whether they are or not, injunctions 
issued under the Act bind the 
members personally. 
3. Removal from office. Members 
of a public body who "knowingly" 
violate injunctions issued under 
the Act may be removed from 
office by an action brought by the 
prosecuting attorney or by the 
Attorney General. 
4. Contempt. Since removal from 
office is not mentioned as the 
exclusive remedy for violations 
(See next page) 
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of injunctions, the courts' contempt 
powers still should be available 
to the party who sought the 
injunction, and perhaps to others 
as well. The stated purpose of 
the injunctions is, after all, 
to "compel" obedience to the Act. 
5. Invalidation of acts. Section 
(H) requires that the acts of a 
public body be adopted in open 
session; otherwise they are 
"invalid" and may be ignored. In 
addition, even if an act is done 
in open session, it is invalid if 
it "results from deliberations 
in a meeting not open to the 
public; unless the deliberations 
were conducted at an executive 
session for a purpose specifically 
authorized" by the Act. 
The precise effects of invali-
dation upon those dealing with 
government agencies is not spelled 
out in the Act--and deliberately 
to allow the courts discretion to 
relieve against hardship. "Hardship" 
will usually involve employees, 
contractors, suppliers, and others 
doing business with public bodies. 
Since violations of this Act are 
obviously not defects which will 
appear in the record, the claims 
of these contractors and others will 
have considerable ethical appeal. 
LOOPHO LES FOR COMM ITTEES? 
The Sunshine Law declares that 
"all meetings of any ••• committee •.• of 
a state agency, institution or 
authority .•• are declared to be 
public meetings open to the public 
at all times." In the face of such 
clear language, some at CSU never-
theless contend that the meetings of 
all committees within, say, a state 
· university, are not open and public. 
Their argument is apparently this: 
that the phrase "or similar decision-
making body" in the definition of 
"public body" relates back to the 
other words, "board, commission, 
committee," and limits them. Only 
boards, commissions and committees 
which make decisions are "public 
bodies," according to this view. 
Since everyone knows that most 
committees and many boards make 
recommendations only, they are not 
"decision-making" bodies and may 
therefore continue to meet in secret, 
or so the argument runs. The 
following points would seem to 
undermine this line of reasoning. 
--First of all, the plain words of 
the statute spe~if ically include 
"any committee ••. " True, the 
sentence goes on to mention "or 
similar decision-making body"; but 
far from limiting the meaning of 
"committee" the phrase actually 
reinforces it. "Similar" to what? 
"Similar" to any board, commission, 
or committee. The phrase "or 
similar decision-making body" 
expresses the legislature's judgment 
that a committee is a decision-
making body--any committee is; and 
that groups with similar functions 
(but different names) are also subject 
to the Act. To use a familiar 
example, the phrase in Section 165(c)(3) 
of the Internal Revenue Code, "fire, 
storm, shipwreck, or other casualty," 
expresses the Congressional view that 
such events--even the small ones--are 
casualties. Had Congress used the 
word "catastrophe " or "cataclysm" 
instead, a fire would be no less a 
fire. 
--A distinction between decision-
making and non-decision-making bodies 
is obviously an important one, if 
in fact it exists. Would such a 
distinction likely have been left to 
implication, and placed in a 
definitional section at that? I 
say "implication''because the Act 
nowhere mentions "non-decision-
making" or "advisory" bodies; nor 
does it even attempt to define 
"decision-making body," except by 
reference to boards, commissions and 
committees. In short, the supposed 
distinction has been pulled from 
thin air. 
The Back Door 
In light of past experience, the 
legislature would have been foolish 
to create yet another simplistic 
either/or distinction for the 
courts to grab hold of. The example 
of municipal liability for wrongs 
committed in a "proprietary" but not 
in a "governmental" capacity comes 
readily to mind and is as capricious 
as any. The "decision" versus 
"recommendation" distinction misses 
entirely the subtlety of the 
decision-making process, which inclu~~~ 
committees and their reports. In 
addition, it invites officials to 
evade the law by structuring their 
processes so that all acts of 
deliberative bodies are but 
"recommendations" to the governing 
board of an institution, which alone 
can make "decisions." 
Committees do, in fact, make 
decisions, and every committee reference 
involves a delegation of authority. 
Lawyers are apt to think of "decisions" 
in terms of court decisions; but 
"decision" has another meaning more 
appropriate to non-judicial bodies, 
that is, simply a "conclusion" upon 
a given matter. In this sense, 
committees do make decisions upon the 
subjects submitted or entrusted to 
them. These decisions are called 
reports; and they affect the parent 
assembly's thought and action in 
important ways, whether they are 
ultimately adopted or not. 
The term "public body" retains a 
core of meaning quite apart from the 
specific examples given in the 
definition, exhaustive though they 
attempt to be. The very purpose of 
these examples is to decrease 
vagueness and increase precision, but 
all of them attempt to answer the 
question: what is a "public body"? 
It is important here to 
distinguish between the two types of 
committees an observer will likely 
encounter within a state institution. 
First, there are the committees of 
such admittedly "public bodies" 
as the governing boards of state 
institutions. A committee of a 
public body is itself a public body. 
What else could it be, a private 
body? 
But there are often a host of other 
committees within an institution 
which are not established by 
resolution of the governing board 
and do not report to it. Instead, 
they are appointed by officials or 
groups to whom the governing board 
Moot Court Results 
Cleveland-Marshall placed third 
in a field of twelve schools at 
the recent 1975 Region VI Moot 
Court Competition, held in Cleve-
land November 5 - 7. 
With two teams representing each 
school, Ohio State finished first. 
Cleveland-Marshall lost its bid 
for second place in a semi-finals 
match with Case. 
has delegated power. These 
committees may have a niche in the 
organizational hierarchy, or they 
may float in space, so to speak. 
Whatever their station in life, 
they are still "public bodies." 
Why? Because they are committees 
of the state institutions "of" in 
the sense of "part of," "coming 
from," or "within." 
--As mentioned earlier, Section(A) 
of the Act directs that it be 
liberally construed. This means when 
in doubt, open the meeting. 
--Finally, Ohio Senator David L. 
Headley, Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee and of the sub-committee 
of three which drafted the bill, 
states that it was intended to apply 
(and does apply) to all committees 
of a state institution, by whatever 
name they may be known and whatever 
their function, be it decision-
making, advisory or otherwise. 
~ ...................................................................................... .. 
Notes & 
f"bVIES 
CSU Film Society 
A Chump at 
Oxford 
Venom 
11:00 
8:00 
10:30 
Briefs 
Nov. 21 
Nov. 28 
29 
Call 687-3800 for further information. 
CWRU Film Society 
Little Colonel 
Brief Vacation 
Harold & Maude 
7:00 
9:30 
6:00 
8:00 
10:00 
7:00 
9:30 
Nov. 25 
Nov. 29 
Dec. 2 
CWRU Images of Women Series 
A Doll's House Dec. 7 
Call 368-2463 at CWRU for enter-
tainment information. 
SPECIAL EVENTS 
Ramsey Clark 
Tuesday, Nov. 25 at noon in the 
Law Student Lounge. Topic: "The 
Law: An Effective Instrument for 
Social Change." No admission 
charge. The public is invited. 
GENERAL 
Photographs of Graduating Seniors 
Wed., Nov. 26: Make-up day 
1:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m., Room 0076 
(SBA Office). 
Deadline for Locker Registration 
Nov. 26. Locks will be removed 
from all unregistered lockers 
and locker contents taken to 
the Security Department. 
New York Times Subscriptions - Winter 
Quarter 
Dave Miller, Room 1057, during 
exam week. $10.00 per quarter, 
checks or money orders payable 
to C.S.U. 
Course Selection Adjustment 
Dropped: 
Workmen's Legislation 
Protection (1681, Sec. 25) 
Added: 
Motion Practice (L644, Sec. 25, 
3 credit hours, Call No. 4548, 
M,W,Th. 2:00-2:50, Prof. Browne) 
Faculty Meetings 
Friday, · Dec. 12 
Room CB 2062, 3-5:00 p.m. 
....... HIH ... HlllllllllllllllllHllllllllHHlllllllllll .. 11 ... 11...i 
